Bhopal disaster Wikipedia. The Bhopal disaster, also referred to as the Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas leak incident in India, considered the worlds worstindustrial disaster. 1It occurred on the night of 23 December 1. Union Carbide India Limited UCIL pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. News, reviews, previews, tips, and downloads for multiple platforms. This is one of the best sites i know keep up the good work. Over 5. 00,0. 00 people were exposed to methyl isocyanate MIC gas and other chemicals. The highly toxic substance made its way into and around the shanty towns located near the plant. 2Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,2. The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,7. A government affidavit in 2. Others estimate that 8,0. The cause of the disaster remains under debate. The Indian government and local activists argue that slack management and deferred maintenance created a situation where routine pipe maintenance caused a backflow of water into a MIC tank, triggering the disaster. Union Carbide Corporation UCC contends water entered the tank through an act of sabotage. The owner of the factory, UCIL, was majority owned by UCC, with Indian Government controlled banks and the Indian public holding a 4. In 1. 98. 9, UCC paid 4. In 1. 99. 4, UCC sold its stake in UCIL to Eveready Industries India Limited EIIL, which subsequently merged with Mc. Leod Russel India Ltd. Eveready ended clean up on the site in 1. Madhya Pradesh. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2. Civil and criminal cases were filed in the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving UCC and Warren Anderson, UCC CEO at the time of the disaster. 67 In June 2. UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about 2,0. Indian law. An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before the judgement was passed. 1 Anderson died on 2. September 2. 01. 4. 8The pre event phase. The UCIL factory was built in 1. Sevin UCCs brand name for carbaryl using methyl isocyanate MIC as an intermediate. 5 A MIC production plant was added in 1. After the Bhopal plant was built, other manufacturers, including Bayer, produced carbaryl without MIC, though at a greater manufacturing cost. Bayer also used the UCC process at the chemical plant once owned by UCC at Institute, West Virginia, in the United States. 1. The chemical process employed in the Bhopal plant had methylamine reacting with phosgene to form MIC, which was then reacted with 1 naphthol to form the final product, carbaryl. This route differed from the MIC free routes used elsewhere, in which the same raw materials were combined in a different manufacturing order, with phosgene first reacting with naphthol to form a chloroformate ester, which was then reacted with methylamine. In the early 1. 98. MIC. 51. 2Earlier leaks. In 1. 97. 6, two local trade unions complained of pollution within the plant. 51. In 1. 98. 1, a worker was accidentally splashed with phosgene as he was carrying out a maintenance job of the plants pipes. In a panic, he removed his gas mask and inhaled a large amount of toxic phosgene gas, leading to his death just 7. In January 1. 98. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks. One month later, in February 1. MIC leak affected 1. In August 1. 98. 2, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 3. Later that same year, in October 1. MIC leak. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. During 1. 98. 3 and 1. MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination. 51. The leakage and its subsequent effects. Liquid MIC storage. The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 6. MIC storage tanks E6. E6. 11, and E6. 19. In the months leading up to the December leak, liquid MIC production was in progress and being used to fill these tanks. UCC safety regulations specified that no one tank should be filled more than 5. MIC. Each tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas. This pressurization allowed liquid MIC to be pumped out of each tank as needed, and also kept impurities out of the tanks. 1. In late October 1. E6. 10 lost the ability to hold most of its nitrogen gas pressure. It meant that the liquid MIC contained within could not be pumped out. At the time of this failure, tank E6. MIC. 1. 51. 6 Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at the Bhopal facility, and parts of the plant were shut down for maintenance. Maintenance included the shutdown of the plants flare tower so that a corroded pipe could be repaired. 1. With the flare tower still out of service, production of carbaryl was resumed in late November, using MIC stored in the two tanks still in service. An attempt to re establish pressure in tank E6. December failed, so the 4. MIC contained within still could not be pumped out of it. 1. The release. Tank 6. During decontamination of the plant, tank 6. In early December 1. MIC related safety systems were not functioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes. 5 During the late evening hours of 2 December 1. Tank E6. 10 whilst trying to unclog it, which contained 4. MIC that had been there since late October. 5 Introduction of water into the tank began a runawayexothermic reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and other factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding non stainless steel pipelines. 5 The pressure in tank E6. Pa by 1. 1 p. m. Two different senior refinery employees assumed the reading was instrumentation malfunction. 1. By 1. 1 3. 0 p. m., workers in the MIC area were feeling the effects of minor exposure to MIC gas, and began to look for a leak. One was found by 1. MIC supervisor on duty at the time. The decision was made to address the problem after a 1. The leak was discussed by MIC area employees during the break. 1. In the five minutes after the tea break ended at 1. E6. 10 quickly reached a critical state. Temperatures in the tank were indicated off its scale, maxed out beyond 2. C 7. 7 F, and the pressure in the tank was indicated at 4. Pa. One employee witnessed a concrete slab above tank E6. Pa even after atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas had begun. 1. Direct atmospheric venting should have been prevented or at least partially mitigated by at least three safety devices which were not working properly, not in use, or insufficiently sized 1. A refrigeration system meant to cool tanks containing liquid MIC, shut down in January 1. June 1. 98. 4. Since the MIC storage system assumed refrigeration, its high temperature alarm, set to sound at 1. C 5. 2 F had long since been disconnected, and tank storage temperatures ranged between 1. C 5. 9 F and 4. C 1. 04 F. 2. A flare tower, to burn the MIC gas as it escaped, which had had a connecting pipe removed for maintenance, and was improperly sized to deal with a leak of the size produced by tank E6. A vent gas scrubber, which had been turned off at the time and was in standby mode, and had insufficient caustic soda and power to deal with a leak of the magnitude produced. About 3. 0 metric tons of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 4. This would increase to 4. The gases were blown in a southeasterly direction over Bhopal. 52.